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FMS for Unmanned Aerial Systems: HMI Issues
and New Interface Solutions
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Abstract To integrate UASs in the NAS, an im-
provement in navigation, planning, communication
and 4D trajectory control capabilities is mandatory.
A way to obtain this enhance is to adopt a Flight
Management System. A FMS for an UAS has some
differences with respect to one for a manned air-
craft, in terms of architecture and performed func-
tions. In particular, from HMI point of view, the
specific UAS human factor issues shall be added
to the current manned FMS interface lacks. Start-
ing from these considerations, a new FMS HMI
for the Alenia Aeronautica TCS has been developed,
using as data entry devices two touch screens.
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1 Introduction
To integrate UASs in the National Airspace
System, an improvement in navigation, planning,
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communication and 4D trajectory control capabil-
ities is mandatory. A way to obtain this enhance
is to adopt a Flight Management System (i.e. the
system that manages on manned aircraft navi-
gation, flight planning, performance calculation
and optimization, guidance and communications).
The FMS has been used by airliners since the
1980s and it can give a great improvement in the
UAS operational performances, with a series of
modifications that take into account the peculiar-
ities of the unmanned systems. The main FMS
functions (like the navigation management and
flight planning), have yet been performed by the
current UASs, but the related performances are in
most cases poor with respect to airliners. Besides
there is not a good level of integration between
these functions offered by a FMS adopted for
unmanned aircraft. At this purpose, some tests
have been done by General Electric, AAI and US
Army in the December 2009 integrating a FAA
certified FMS on a Shadow 200. These results
were promising [1].
From the Human Factor point of view, the
FMS raises several issues, since the unmanned
system HMI problems are added to current air-
liner interface limits. The GCS HMI varies sig-
nificantly from the traditional manned aircraft
cockpits, with also changes in the user role, that
shifts from pilot to system operator. In particular
the interfaces vary significantly with the Level Of
Automation and the specific vehicle controlled
(e.g. external vs. internal operator). A key point
is that the actual GCSs are perfectible from this
point of view, since the human factors are still
one of the main mishap causes. This, in particular,
is mandatory for the integration of the UAS in
the NAS. In fact NASA has recently started a
specific research program with particular care on
the Human Systems Integration [2, 3]. A further
reason to improve the current HMI configuration
is the need of greater interoperability according
to the STANAG 4586 [4]. This regulation poten-
tially requires for a GCS the capability to control
several different UAVs at the same time, with the
consequent challenges for the FMS.
In this paper the preliminary results obtained
by a research activities done jointly by “Politec-
nico di Torino” and “Alenia Aeronautica Spa”
about the development of a FMS for UAS are
reported, considering as reference a fixed wing
MALE aircraft with a large fixed-based TCS. In
particular, the new HMI solutions are presented.
The results of the study are general and can ap-
ply also to the SMAT project, i.e. a joint research
between industries and universities (in which the
Politecnico di Torino is a partner and Alenia
Aeronautica is the leader) that aims to develop an
integrated systems with UASs of different classes
to monitor the Piemonte Region, in the North
West of Italy.
Fig. 1 Differences
between manned aircraft
and UAS FMSs
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Fig. 2 Manned aircraft
and UAS FMS main
function comparison
2 FMS for UASs
In general a FMS consist of two or more comput-
ers (FMCs) and an interface with the operators.
The interface presents different displays and pan-
els (e.g. the navigation display and the autopilot
mode control panel), with the MCDU as primary
data entry device. While on a manned aircraft the
whole system is on board, on UAS part of the
FMCs plus the HMI in the ground segment (GCS)
and the remaining FMCs on board; they are linked
together by the data-link. Moreover, according
to the STANAG 4586, the ground segment shall
be able to interface with different vehicles (also
several at the same time) (Fig. 1).
Over the system architecture, there are also
differences in the performed functions and in the
allocation between the ground and on board seg-
ments. In particular, many functions can be per-
formed in the two segments, with the tendency to
allocate most functions on board to increase the
LOA. In the figure below a possible division be-
tween the main FMS function is represented (usu-
ally there are also secondary functions specific of
each application, here not considered) (Fig. 2).
The FMS HMI shall permit to the operator to
set all the data relative to these functions and to
monitor the system behavior.
3 Need of Human Factors Improvement
for UASs
UASs have a very low reliability with respect to
all categories of manned aircraft (fighters, liners,
commuters and general aviation), as shown fol-
lowing table representing data relative to the US
UASs [5, 6] (Table 1).
The reasons of these poor performances are
different: airframe systems/engine fails, human
factors issues, lack of operator training, procedure
violations and so on. In particular the main mishap
reasons are the mechanical failures, followed by
the human factors (the data are always referred to
the USA fleet) [5, 6] (Table 2).
Analogous data are available for the Israeli
UASs, with 60% of mishaps due to airframe sys-
tems/engine fails and 22% to the human factors.
Table 1 Class A mishap rates per 100,000 flight hours
UAV mishaps Manned aircraft mishaps
Predator—32a F16—3
Pioneer—334a General aviation—1
Hunter—55a Regional commuter—0.1
Large airliners—0.01
aMuch less than 100,000 flight hours (2004)
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Table 2 UAV mishap causes
UAV mishap cause Percent
Airframe systems/engine 62
Human factors 17
Communications 11
Miscellaneous 10
The influence of human factors on mishaps
varies according to the specific UAS considered:
ranging for example from the 21% of the Shadow
to the 67% of the Predator (2004) [7].
The term “human factor” involves several as-
pects: automation interaction, display design, pro-
cedures violation, lack of operator training, land-
ing and take off errors and so on.
Integrating a FMS with the relative interface
shall help to reduce this high mishap rate, taking
into account all the related accident/incident
causes to design an improved HMI.
4 Human Factor Challenges for UAS
The physical separation between vehicle and op-
erator introduces several human factor issues
that make the design of the interface extremely
different from an aircraft cockpit. Many of these
issues are directly related to the FMS interface,
but since it is integrated in a more complex HMI,
it is more appropriate to consider the HMI as a
whole. These challenges are:
(a) Dif ferent functions allocation between user
and automation: the functions allocation be-
tween user and automation is different with
respect to the manned aircraft, especially in
the case of autonomous UAV or control
of several vehicles by a single GCS. Be-
sides for the UASs some specific functions
(not present on manned aircraft) are pro-
vided, like the capability to wipe out the on
board computer memory for the Predator
[7, 8]. Moreover a single UAV can be able
to operate with different level of automa-
tion, for example switching between manual,
semiautomatic and full automatic modes.
This fact increases the importance of a cor-
rect human–automation interaction, there-
fore HMI design shall consider the relative
problems.
(b) Huge disparity in LOA: the current UASs
are very different in level of automation,
ranging from vehicles controlled manually by
the user to semi and full autonomous ones.
Besides, different LOA are possible for a
single UAV. This fact complicates the design
of an interface, since different feedbacks, dis-
play layouts and controls shall be provided
according to the implemented automation.
This is particularly true for a fully interoper-
able GCS. Also operator training issues play
an important role at this purpose.
(c) Lack of sensory cues: with respect to a
manned aircraft, where the pilot is embed-
ded in the vehicle that is controlling, the GSC
operators suffer the lack of several sens-
ory cues: ambient visual input, kinaesthetic
(experience of body position, weight and
body movement provided by tactile sensors),
vestibular (sense of balance and equilibrium
provided by the inner ear) and auditory in-
formation [8, 9]. These lacks potentially re-
duce the user situational awareness. To avoid
this risk, a proper display design shall be
adopted to provide to the operator the nec-
essary information. It is particularly true for
the remote manual control of the UAV that
needs an imagery of the environment from
an on board camera, with all the limitations
due to the limited FOV, the image resolu-
tion and refresh rate (also constrained by
the data-link bandwidth). Besides, the lack
of sensory cues can be a problem also for
more automatic UAVs, since for example
the operator does not have a direct sensory
feedback of the turbulence offset (detectable
only from a delayed camera imagery). Sev-
eral solutions have been developed to solve
this problem: audio warnings (standard for
the manned aircraft and useful to improve
the awareness of an alert offset), multi-
sensory displays (e.g. tactile feedback, force
feedback on the control stick, spatial audio
cueing, speech control, etc.) and synthetic vi-
sion. Nevertheless for the last two technolo-
gies further research activities are needed to
assess their real benefits [8, 9].
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(d) Information overload/boring: a possible risk
of sensory cues lack is that the operator could
be overloaded with too many information
to contrast its isolation from the vehicle.
Considering also that almost all information
are provided on the displays (visual sensory
channel), this can cause a high workload for
the operator [10]. On the contrary, if the
operator is not involved in the control loop,
he/she will be bored, with a reduced capabil-
ity to withstand a sudden event.
(e) Latency: the latency introduced by the data-
link makes more difficult the manual control
of the vehicle especially during take-off and
landing. This is particularly true in case of
BLOS control via satellite (in fact it is not
used near the ground). This is a further rea-
son to increase the LOA of UASs.
(f) Long duration missions: several typical UAS
missions (e.g. monitoring, searching, com-
munication relay, etc.) have a long duration
(even several days in the future), with the
consequent need of a proper crew turnover
to guarantee always a good level of the hu-
man performances. Besides, the interface de-
sign shall concur to provide the correct crew
workload and situational awareness, consid-
ering also the human weakness to maintain
a proper vigilance for long time period with
low task demands (typical case of cruise
phases of monitoring, search and so on) [8].
(g) Handover procedure: the handover is the
procedure for passing the control of a
UAV/payload from a GCS to another one,
from an external pilot to a GCS internal one
or from a crew to another one in the same
GCS. From the procedural errors point of
view, this is critical for the safety, with sev-
eral mishaps in the past [7, 11]. On this sub-
ject, the STANAG 4586 is useful to imple-
ment the handover among different GCSs,
providing a set of standard messages for the
control exchange, that helps to define a pro-
cedure for each specific system.
(h) Lack of standardization: there is a lack of
standardization in the GCS HMIs due to
huge disparity in LOA between UASs and
the relative low know-how (at least with re-
spect to the manned aircraft). So there are
not specific standards and guidelines that
help the design of the new systems.
(i) Lack of application of manned cockpit know-
how: most of the current GCSs do not con-
sider (or consider marginally) the experience
matured in a century of manned aircraft
flight and mishaps. The GCS must not be
equal to a cockpit for all the reasons listed
above, but some basic HMI rules and expe-
riences obtained from the manned aircraft
background shall be considered within the
context of the UASs. Some studies, in fact,
confirm that the present GCSs are not prop-
erly designed from the human factor per-
spective [7, 9]. This is probably also due to
the fact that several of the current UASs
have been designed by not primarily aircraft
manufactures [7].
(j) Lack of standardization of user qualif ication
and training: at the moment there are not
specific rules that state the figure, back-
ground, training and qualification of the
UAS users. In particular for the control of
the vehicle some air forces (like IAF) con-
sider only rated military pilots, while others
(e.g. USAF) employ both rated military pi-
lots and not-flying officers (in most case with
a limited flight training on manned aircraft
[12]). In particular the use of rated pilot can
be useful in the case of UAVs manually con-
trolled, where his/her flying skills are directly
exploited. Considering the manual control
by a remote pilot, inevitably, the displays
layout tends to be similar to that of cock-
pit displays with some particularities typi-
cal of the unmanned systems. Nevertheless
the development trend of the UAS is more
toward greater autonomy, with a different
role of the user, shifting from the figure of
a pilot having direct control of the vehicle
to a system operator able to control one or
more UAVs simultaneously with higher level
commands. In this case the flying skills are
not needed and the interface is no longer
related to cockpits (e.g. stick, throttle and
pedals are not need). To conclude: the design
of an interface is strictly related to the role,
skills and background of the final user, with a
tendency toward more autonomous systems.
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5 Human Supervisory Control
The function allocation between human and au-
tomation can be detailed considering the para-
digm of “Human Supervisory Control”, according
to which the operator is a remote supervisor and
manager of one or more UAS, interacting inter-
mittently with one or more computers [13, 14].
This “computer-mediated control” is typical of
several applications like ATM, power plants, sev-
eral military systems, modern aircraft (e.g. an air-
liner in cruise), space systems, and it is particularly
suitable to describe the control of an unmanned
system.
The HSC can be broken up in four nested
control loops [13, 14] as shown in Fig. 3.
The innermost loop represents the basic flight
control of the UAV and it is directly related to
the specific vehicle dynamics. The second loop
is related to the navigation control in terms of
planning (route decisions, no-fly-zones avoiding,
modifications of an existing route, etc.), execution
of the action decided and route heading (track)
determination. The third loop finally is the highest
level one, devoted to the management of the mis-
sion and of the payload. If one of these loops fails,
also the higher level loops will fail. Parallel to the
control loops there is a continuous system health
and status monitoring that involves all previous
loops. In general, each loop can be demanded to
the operator or to the automation.
As said before, the tendency is toward a greater
automation: almost all current MALEs have an
autopilot system and many of them have also
advanced automatic navigation mode (e.g. the
Global Hawk flies its missions from take-off to
landing in automatic way [9]). The FMS, in partic-
ular, permits an automatic (autonomous in the fu-
ture) management of the two inner loops. There-
fore the operator is able to concentrate himself on
the higher level of mission management and mon-
itoring of automation. This requires knowledge-
based decisions and in general it is difficult to
allocate it to the automation [15].
In conclusions, by adopting this way, a single
operator is able to control several UAVs at the
same time.
6 Automation Interaction Problems
The introduction of the automation aims to two
objectives: reducing the physical workload of the
operator and increasing the safety, replacing the
humans in the execution of prolonged and repet-
itive/critical tasks. An example is the autopilot
that relieves the pilot from the need to maintain
a continuous manual control of the aircraft, and
helps him in the execution of critical operations
like the landing in marginal weather conditions.
Despite this, there are situations in which, on
the contrary, the automation increases the cog-
nitive workload of the operator, and reduces the
global system performances and potentially leads
to mishaps. This is due to a poor level of inte-
gration of the automation with the operator that
shall be always adequately maintained inside the
control loop. As elements of a complex system,
in fact, human and automation shall be optimized
one respect to the other to provide the best
effectiveness.
This problem has been extensively considered
for manned aircraft in the last decades after some
serious accidents, but for the UASs there are still
some open items. In the case of unmanned sys-
tems, in fact, the interaction with the automation
Fig. 3 Nested control
loop for HSC of UASs
[13, 14]
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is more complex for the reasons listed before. In
particular these problems are strictly related to
the FMS, that is the core of the automation. The
main issues of the human–automation interaction
are [8, 9, 13–20]:
(a) Mode awareness/confusion: the terms “mode”
can be defined in several ways and in general
is referred to a particular state of the system
associated to a unique behavior. Considering
the block diagram of the Human Supervisory
Control, different modes are associated each
control loop: autopilot, navigation, payload,
mission management and system monitoring.
Unfortunately, the increase of the automa-
tion in a system is frequently associated to a
decrease in the transparency of the automa-
tion behavior, with a following reduction
of the operator situational awareness. This
fact is know as “mode awareness/confusion”
and is characterized by a misunderstanding
of the current active mode or a lack of
comprehension of the behavior of the au-
tomation in a certain mode. In both cases
the operator could do an inappropriate re-
quest to the system or in general could do
correct action for his/her situation percep-
tion, but incorrect for the actual mode, with
potentially serious consequences (like some
accidents involving airliners in the 1990s).
This problem is due to several factors as
the complexity of the system and the poor
interface design. Considering as an example
a traditional airliner autopilot, there are in
average 25 different possible modes, with
consequent increase of the mnemonic load
for the operator that shall remember the
behavior of each of them. Moreover, in the
advanced navigation modes (managed by the
FMS) there are frequently automatic mode
changes that are not easily perceived by the
pilot (a recent research indicates that a per-
centage between the 30% and 40% of them
are in average undetected), due to the lack
of a proper feedback from the system and to
an incorrect automation mental model of the
operator. In fact, while monitoring a semi-
automatic mode (e.g. altitude, vertical speed,
heading and airspeed hold) is relatively easy,
since the situation can be monitored with
the same instruments (altimeter, variometer,
HSI, etc.) used in manual flight, to follow a
route in automatic mode is more complicated
without clear indications of the system be-
havior due to FMS and autopilot interfaces.
The poor automation mental model is due
both to the system complexity (e.g. in aver-
age a pilot reaches a good knowledge of a
FMS after 12–18 months of use) and to the
difficulty for the operator to understand the
automation behavior, also in the cases where
it follows the basic manual flight rules (e.g.
the difference between the modes control-
ling the airspeed with the pitch and the ones
using the throttle).
If this is a problem for a manned aircraft, for
a UAS it is still more relevant, due to the
greater level of autonomy and the different
functions allocation between human and au-
tomation. It is therefore fundamental to de-
sign the system in a way that makes it easy
and effective to use, with a proper HMI
that provides all information needed by the
operator.
(b) Automation management: the automation
can be managed at two different levels: by
consent and by exception. In the first, the op-
erator shall approve each action (i.e. the au-
tomation can not take any initiative without
the human approval); while in the second the
automation gives some time to the operator
to reject the proposed action and without a
veto it will follow out the action. Manage-
ment by consent is the more traditional way
to use the automation, but to obtain a greater
LOA a shift toward the management by ex-
ception is needed. To fulfill this requirement
the interface shall be designed to provide all
needed information to the operator to take
the correct decision in a proper time. Some
serious accidents due to a poor HMI design,
in fact, occurred in the past, like the friendly-
fire of Patriot missiles in the operation “Iraqi
Freedom”. However if the management by
exception can be the foreseeable solution for
the future military applications, in the case
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of civil use of UASs the subject is still dis-
puted. For example the FAA asserts that any
UAV that flies in the NAS shall be directly
controlled by a human.
(c) Increasing cognitive demand: as said before,
the automation reduces the physical work-
load of the operator, by replacing him/her in
the execution of many manual tasks and in-
creasing at the same time the cognitive work-
load. The operator, in fact, is more involved
in activities of decision making, planning and
monitoring, with a shift of his/her role from
direct controller of the system to supervisor.
In some situations, the cognitive workload
can increase too much (cognitive overload),
with an important performance reduction
and the possibility of mishaps. The HMI is
fundamental to reduce this risk, aiding the
operator to be correctly inside the control
loop.
(d) Increasing monitoring demand: the need to
monitor the automation behavior and the
system status has increased the monitoring
demand of the operator. Unfortunately the
humans have poor capacity to maintain a
high visual attention for more than 30 min,
independently by the motivations of the op-
erator. This is particularly true when the au-
tomation works correctly, lowering further
the operator vigilance, with the risk that
he/she can not be able to react properly
and rapidly to withstand a sudden event. So
the interface shall provide a proper system
feedback to help the monitoring and have a
good system of alerts that draws the opera-
tor attention in case of failures or particular
events.
(e) Unbalanced workload: the automation re-
duces the operator workload especially in the
mission phases yet characterized by a lower
workload, like for example the cruise. On
the contrary, in the phases of high workload
(e.g. in the proximity of an airport), instead,
the automation could increase the operator
workload, because it is difficult to use the
automation in a reduced time, mainly due
to poor interfaces. For this reason, many
airlines prohibit their crews to use the FMS
in the terminal area. For a high LOA UAS,
however, this could be a serious problem
and then the HMI shall be designed to
make the interactions more user-friendly and
immediate.
(f) Increase crew coordination requirements: the
introduction of the automation in the avi-
ation has stressed the need of a greater
crew resource management inside the cock-
pit. Due to the difficulty to monitor the
automation behavior and the possibility of
mode confusion, a communication between
the crew members about the automation use
is mandatory to avoid the risk of a misun-
derstanding about automation work. This is
particularly true for a UAS, especially in the
case of control of several UAVs.
(g) Mis-calibration of trust in the automation: it
is really important for the operator to devel-
ops a correct trust in the system automation.
The trust is function of several parameters:
easiness of use, reliability, interface, and it
should be neither too high nor too low. If
it is overmuch, it is present the so called
“automation complacency”, that is a state
in which the operator relies too much on
the automation, neglecting the signals of an
improper work or failure and continuing to
use it until the mishap. Vice versa, with a low
trust, the operator does not develop a correct
relationship with the system and he/she will
tend to deactivate (if possible) the automa-
tion in case of problems, to take the manual
control of the system, also in the cases in
which this is not the safer solution (e.g. a
landing with reduced visibility). These two
situations have caused many accidents in the
manned aviation. It has to be noted as for the
UASs with a high LOA is not possible to by-
pass the automation.
To conclude, although the humans have been
removed from the vehicle, in the UASs the in-
tegration of the operator in the control loop is
mandatory, with several human factors issues that
can compromise the overall performances and the
system safety.
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7 Human–Automation Interaction Model
In literature are present several models and the-
ories to describe the interaction between human
and automation. In this paper the RAFIV (Refor-
mulate Access Format Insert Verify) model was
chosen as reference. It was created by a partner-
ship between Honeywell, University of Colorado
(Institute of Cognitive Science) and NASA Ames
Research Center. Although it has a general valid-
ity, the RAFIV model has been developed with a
particular care to the interaction with the MCDU,
that is however representative of the interaction
with many other interfaces. According to this
model, the interface efficiency and robustness are
function of the volume of memorized action se-
quences. The interaction process can be broken
down in five different steps [21, 22] (Fig. 4):
(1) Reformulate: as a first, the mission task is
reformulate into a series of sub-tasks to per-
form and data to enter in the automatic sys-
tem. In other words the operator creates a
mental description of how the automation
will be used to accomplish the mission task.
For example a change in the flight plan can
be converted into a set of data (new waypoint
and its attributes) that shall be entered in the
automation.
(2) Access: having a clear idea of the operation
to do, the operator accesses to the right in-
terface (e.g. a hierarchy of MCDU pages, the
autopilot mode control panel, a multifunc-
tion display, etc.). This step represents the
action that shall be taken on the interface
to display the field for the data entry or to
orient the operator attention to the correct
input device.
(3) Format: when reached the right interface,
the operator enters the data with the proper
format.
(4) Insert: when the data have been entered, they
are inserted in the correct location. This step
is typical of a MCDU, where the data are first
typed in the scratchpad and then inserted in
the proper field.
(5) Verify and Monitor: when a command has
been given to the automation, the operator
checks if it has been actually accepted, if the
automation performs correctly the command
itself and if the command was appropriate to
accomplish the mission task.
Fig. 4 RAFIV model [21]
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Each of the previous steps can be performed by
the operator by recalling the appropriate actions
from the long-term memory or recognizing them
from visual cues provided by the interface [21]. It
is demonstrated that the training time for actions
that rely completely on the memory is 2–20 times
greater than that performed with the aid of visual
cues. Besides, the action based on memory recall
and performed infrequently exhibit a completion
probability lower than 50% [21], with consequent
operator skill deterioration. Nevertheless, many
current interfaces are lacking from this point of
view: considering for example the MCDU of the
Boeing B-777 with a sample of 102 mission tasks,
74% of them need memorized action sequences
and the 46% occurs infrequently [21].
To summarize, according to the RAFIV model
the interaction between humans and automation
is optimized when the number of memorized ac-
tion sequences recalls is minimum [21]. In particu-
lar to satisfy these criteria the following guidelines
for the interface design can be drawn:
• The interface shall support directly (as much
as possible) the mission task execution to re-
duce the workload related to the reformulate
step,
• The operator shall be guided in the inter-
face interaction with visual cues like labels,
prompt, dialog boxes, pop up and so on,
• The step of verity and monitor can be sim-
plified displaying to the operator a visual rep-
resentation of automation state.
8 New Alenia Aeronautica FMS
HMI—A General Overview
The research activity has been realized in the
development of some FMS interface formats for
the Alenia Aeronautica TCS (a so called “Tactical
Control Station”. This new interface has been
designed with the constraints to be compliant to
the STANAG 4586 and certifiable by the interna-
tional civil aeronautics authorities, having Alenia
Aeronautica Sky-Y UAS as a first application.
The TCS consist of two interchangeable stations:
one for the pilot and one for the payload operator.
In particular, for the UAV control, the interface
permits several LOA, ranging from the manual re-
mote control of the vehicle to advanced automatic
modes, according to a complete fulfillment of the
interoperability requirement.
Each station has the following layout:
The Main Display is the primary monitoring
device for the operator (no inputs can be given
trough it), whereas two Touch Screens (10 in.)
are used as primary data-entry interfaces with
secondary monitoring functions. In particular a
Touch Screen is devoted to the safety critical
functions and another to the non-safety critical
ones. In the central panel are installed some hard-
wired controls that require a quick access by the
operator. Finally, traditional flight controls are
provided: stick, throttle and pedals (not displayed
in Fig. 5). The HOTAS controls let the opera-
tor to manage some functions in head-up condi-
tions, without releasing the hands from stick and
throttle.
The STANAG 4586 requires potentially to dis-
play all standard message data and the vehicle
specific ones. To accomplish this requirement, it
is mandatory to have a flexible reconfigurable
interface able to adapt its formats according to the
specific vehicle controlled. Therefore the interface
shall be designed with a “point and click” inter-
action philosophy (typical of the GUIs), rather
than a traditional cockpit. On the other hand,
Fig. 5 HMI layout (right station)
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by maintaining a large number of elements al-
ready used for a traditional manned aircraft flight-
deck can be helpful to accelerate the certification
procedure, since unfortunately there is a lack
of specific rules for the UASs and so analogies
with the standards of manned aircraft are usually
adopted. Moreover, this fact involves also the role,
the training and the background of the operator,
who could also have no previous flight experience
and probably will be more confident with a GUI
than a rated pilot could be (on the other hand a
pilot could be disoriented when facing an interface
different from aircraft displays). This is an addi-
tional reason to move toward autonomous system
with an operator as user, with the challenge to get
from the civil aeronautics authorities the acknowl-
edgement of this professional role and the relative
concept of operations.
In the research development the traditional
aeronautics background in human factors has
been merged with the GUI principle of applica-
tions like computers or tablets, taking the advan-
tages of each of them to develop an optimized
solution. In particular all the issues above consid-
ered have been taken into account.
As regard the FMS interface, part of the related
information are displayed on the Main Display,
while the data entry occurs in the two touch
screens. In particular, for monitoring many infor-
mation about the vehicle state are displayed both
on the Main Display and on the touch screens,
while others (in general the details) are present
only on touch screens. In order to simplify the
interaction, on the touch screens are allocated
functions that on a traditional manned aircraft
are controlled using different interface (MCDU,
autopilot mode control panel, radio panel, etc.).
Moreover, in the same format are present both the
controls and the system information feedbacks,
so that the effects of the given commands can be
monitored directly, making easier the execution of
a task.
The formats developed in this research activity
are hosted in the safety critical touch screen and
are relative to the following macro functions (a
subset of the list previously reported in Fig. 2):
• autopilot and navigation,
• radio communications, and
• vehicle configuration.
More in details, the following sub-functions can be
performed in the related format (Table 3):
The implemented functions give great opera-
tional flexibility to the system, obtaining capabil-
ities typical of airliners. This is useful for intro-
ducing the UASs in the NAS. In particular, an
advanced 4D navigation mode is provided.
Table 3 Developed format functions
Autopilot and navigation Radio communications Vehicle configuration
• Mode arming • Transmitter radio selection • UAV configuration setting
• Mode engaging • Receiver radio selection • On board specific data/
parameter loading
• Autopilot demand arming • Frequency setting
• Autopilot demand engaging • Frequency storing
• On board route loading (also
with the UAV in flight) • Frequency loading from database
• Route arming • Emergency frequencies (121.5
and 243 MHz) quick selection
• Route engaging • BIT
• Destination waypoint changing • Interphone configuration setting
• Seeing the waypoints details
(name, coordinates, assigned
speed or time to arrival, etc.)
• Making a “Direct to” toward
a loiter waypoint
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9 Development Process
For the development of the new interface, the
principles of the “User Centered Design” [17]
have been adopted, since they permit to obtain
a high usability, considering the final user at the
center of the design activities. In particular the
following process has been followed (Fig. 6):
By fixing the targets, a theoretical study on the
requirements of the device by the point of view of
the final user (supported also by task analysis) was
performed.
During this phase, a research on the HMI chal-
lenges for UASs and on the lacks and improvable
aspects of the current GCS interfaces was per-
formed and results are those ones reported in the
previous pages.
As second step, the HMI layout has been se-
lected, comparing different possible solutions (e.g.
touch screens, trackball, keyboard, etc.).
Fig. 6 HMI design process
Then a higher level design has been initiated,
either from the functional point of view and from
the definition of the style guide, i.e. the general
guidelines for the design of the symbols and the
interface moding (e.g. color coding, macro push-
button categories, characters, etc.).
The Alenia Aeronautica test pilots have been
involved since these preliminary steps, with the
scope to maintain the users in the design loop.
Some of the new functionalities, in fact, have been
implemented to meet pilot requirements.
At the end of this phase, the functional and
graphics detailed design of the several formats
has been carried on. It was an iterative process
with continuous checks with the specialist of
each system and the test pilots, until the final
configuration was defined. In particular, some
evaluations in a rapid prototyping simulation envi-
ronment have been done, obtaining positive feed-
backs by the pilots about the graphics layout and
interface moding.
At the moment the code is under a develop-
ment phase. A more complete evaluation will be
done when the new FMS will be available in the
TCS test environment and during the next flight-
test campaign.
10 Use of Touch Screens
The touch screens have been selected by a com-
parison with other data entry devices like key-
board, trackball, touchpad or a combination of
them. The use of touch screens in aeronautics is
still at the first stage of application, therefore a
limited number of data are available. Examples
are: the cockpit of the F-35, a FMS of the Garmin
for business jet (under development), studies and
prototypes for airliners and regional transport air-
craft, and some IPad® and IPhone® tools for
general aviation and sailplane pilots. The related
technologies have been recently experienced: a
great improvement in terms of performance, relia-
bility, size and weight has been obtained. This fact
makes really interesting their use, also considering
that GCS is a static device on ground application,
with low vibration and environmental problems
with respect to the on-board ones. Besides, since
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they are diffused in the everyday life, the feeling of
the user with this type of interface has even more
increased.
The use of touch screens gives the following
advantages with respect to the other options:
• More instinctive interactions,
• Possibility to adopt new types of interaction
like for example the scroll movement on the
sliders,
• High flexibility and reconfiguration capability
since all controls are generated via software,
• The alphanumeric keyboards are displayed
only when necessary,
• Greater display dimension with respect to a
traditional Multi Function Display, due to
the absence of line select keys and fixed
keyboards,
• Possibility to have a back-up of the Main Dis-
play in case of failures,
• The Main Display is devoted only to the mon-
itoring, without input interactions on it,
• The current UAV state is always displayed in
the Main Display, giving the capability to see
on the Touch Screens other information about
the mission,
• No size issues related to the keyboard, track-
ball or touchpad positioning.
To decide the formats, the MIL-STD-1472F [23]
has been taken as reference for the response ar-
eas dimensions and relative distances. In partic-
ular, these information are provided distinguish-
ing between alphanumeric keyboard and other
functions pushbuttons. Considering the latter, the
minimum size (16 mm) is greater than a traditional
fingertip pushbuttons size (10 mm for bare finger),
but the minimum distance is lower: 3 versus 13 mm
(single pressure) or 6 mm (sequential pressures).
There is also the same situation for the maximum
values. So virtual pushbuttons takes near the same
areas of hard wired ones. In current aircraft, the
actual size and dimensions could be smaller than
the prescribed values, due to specific size limita-
tions. In our works, however, we have followed
the standard.
Moreover the virtual pushbuttons are only dis-
played when needed. With traditional hard wired
controls, on the contrary, in some cases, part of
the pushbuttons are not used in some formats, and
they take away useful place. Together with the
lack of fixed numeric keyboards, this gives a great
flexibility to the interface, as reported above.
But for new controls, like sliders or scroll bars,
no indications are provided by MIL-STD-1472F.
The standard, in fact, is not updated for these
applications (1999) and a new issue (or another
standard) including these new interaction types
should be provided. In any case, starting from the
given data, some changes have been introduced
when needed.
The touch screens, however, introduce also
some new problems, due to the fact that the
operator does not have a direct feedback if the
control has been pushed. As an example, some
autopilot mode control panels have rotary knobs
of different shapes (square, triangular, circular
sections, etc.) for the demand setting (altitude,
heading, speed, vertical speed demands), to give
this feedback. On this purpose, using the color
coding, an indication is provided, but the operator
should look at the touch screen to avoid the risk of
error. Also for this reason, some critical and quick
access controls are still hard wired in the central
panel.
The tactile feedback touch screens can be a
possible solution, but the technology is still imma-
ture, especially in terms of size and installation.
Besides, to have a vibration at each touch pressure
could be annoying for the operator, with problems
related to the fatigue-life of the device. So the tac-
tile feedback could be limited to some particularly
critical controls.
Eventually, another possible problem is the
following: for example, in case of hard-wired
switches, there is a cover safe guard, but it is
not present for virtual pushbuttons. To over-
come it, different solutions have been adopted:
for example a pop-up displayed when the control
has been pushed or multiple touch actuations in
different positions of the display, according to
the MIL-STD-1472F. These solutions, together
with a proper color coding for the pushbutton
state changes, have been considered satisfactory
to provide a correct Situational Awareness by
the Alenia test pilots. The tactile feedback is for
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Fig. 7 Example of the
autopilot and navigation
page
sure useful, but not mandatory for this type of
applications (Fig. 7).
11 Main Characteristics of the FMS New
Interface
The main characteristics of the developed FMS
interface are:
• Different interfaces of manned aircraft (MCDU,
autopilot panel, radio panel, etc.) are joined
in a single device, in order to simplify the
interaction and the system monitoring.
• The interface has a great flexibility, since all
symbol set is generated via software, making
easy a graphics update.
• Moding (e.g. pushbutton states or specific
functions like numeric keyboard opening) and
graphics (e.g. general page layout, pushbutton
type, color coding, etc.) maintain the greater
possible commonality among the different for-
mats to reduce the operator workload.
• The autopilot and navigation modes have
been reduced as much as possible, joining ba-
sic modes in a single one, to limit the system
complexity without any loss of operational
capability;
• There are not automatic mode changes.
• The automation and the GUI support directly
all mission tasks. In other words, for the func-
tions reported in the Table 3, there are specific
controls are devoted to them. In this way the
“Reformulate” step of the interaction is con-
sistently reduced and as well as the operator
workload.
• The GUI provides a clear direct feedback to
the operator of the state of the automation,
thanks to the color coding and the graphics,
and reduces the possibility of modes confusion
(Fig. 8).
• Using the color coding, a feedback of the
response message coming from the vehicle is
provided (STANAG implementation).
• The GUI guides the operator through visual
cues like for example labels, pop ups and
dialog boxes. So far the mnemonic load is
reduced and the feeling with the interface in-
creases. Just one format can be opened one at
one time. In particular pop-ups are used to ask
confirm to the operator about some critical
Fig. 8 Autopilot mode pushbutton states
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Fig. 9 Pop-up example
controls. To avoid missing/misunderstanding
situations, the other page controls are not
selectable until the operator gives the ac-
knowledgement to the open pop-up. More-
over, when the operator quit from the page,
it automatically closes, annulling the relative
action (Fig. 9).
• Safety critical elements like autopilot mode
pushbuttons and autopilot demand fields are
never covered by other formats (pop-up, dia-
log, etc.). Taking into account the page dimen-
sions with respect to the other formats ones,
this is not a limitation. However, all infor-
mation about current UAV state are always
present in the Main Display.
• The GUI is reconfigurable according to the
STANAG 4586.
• The GUI fulfills STANAG 4671 [24] require-
ments, as it as considered applicable by the
EASA policy E.Y013–01 as a base for cer-
tification [25].
• The software of the GUI is developed accord-
ing to the DO-178B.
12 Conclusions
The Flight Management System integration in
UAS improves operational capabilities in terms
of navigation, planning, communication manage-
ment and 4D trajectory control, and contribute
to open the NAS to UASs. Taking into account
the problems of current manned FMS HMI and
the human factor challenges typical of unmanned
systems, a new FMS interface for the Alenia
Aeronautica TCS has been developed. It is com-
pliant to the STANAG 4586 and certifiable by the
international civil authorities. In particular two
touch screens have been adopted as primary data
entry devices. Merging the principles of aviation
human factors and of the commercial GUIs, the
developed HMI presents innovative solutions to
solve the recognized lacks and increases the per-
formances of the system. These results can be
applied also to the SMAT project (already men-
tioned in the introduction of this paper).
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